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KATARÍNA ŠIPULOVÁ1 
Constitutional crises witnessed in Hungary and Romania in the last few years have 
deeply shaken European political settings, calling into the question the European 
Union’s ability to safeguard its own set of fundamental values and principles, and 
to prevent the proverbial democratic backsliding of member states – an issue 
which becomes quite thorny especially when looking at the role the presumption 
of compliance with EU fundamental rights plays within the EU common market, 
or at long present accusations of double standards in evaluation of democracy and 
human rights protection in the old member states as opposed to candidate 
countries. 
Von Bogdandy’s publication therefore steps into a very lively, yet still 
surprisingly under-researched problematic. Only on 27 July 2016, European 
Commission published new opinion on situation in Poland, which is now under 
the surveillance, possibly as the first country where the new framework for 
safeguarding the rule of law, introduced in March 2014 in reaction to Hungarian 
crisis, can be implemented. While the scholarship covers theoretical aspects of the 
rule of law and its emergence within the European communities, no 
comprehensive empirical work on democratic backsliding and effectiveness of 
different EU mechanisms has been done so far.  
A collective publication Constitutional Crisis in the European Constitutional Area 
builds on examples of constitutional crises in Hungary and Romania, providing 
both analysis of the internal development and external reactions. Authors set out 
to bring suggestions how to deal with different shortcomings of European 
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Institutions – be it the lack of appropriate competences to enforce their position 
or the absence of relevant theoretical framework and common understanding 
of concepts of democracy and rule of law.  
The edited collection is divided into two main sections: The first one, Setting 
the Scene, introduces key constitutional problems and background of constitutional 
crises in Hungary (chapters 1–4) and Romania (chapters 5 and 6). The second 
section, Instruments for Maintaining Constitutionalism in Europe, concentrates on 
systemic deficiencies in the rule of law within the EU law framework (chapters  
7–8), possible effect and impact of the European Convention on Human Rights 
(chapters 9–11), and finally, introduces theories of limits of the constitution-
making power (chapters 12–14). The conclusion, apart from summarizing the 
findings, offers suggestions how to deal with aforementioned problems. 
 
Introduction to Hungarian and Romanian Constitutional Crises 
László Sólyom opens the book with recollection of Hungarian constitutional 
development embedded in various external impulses. The Hungarian 
Constitutional Court enjoyed particularly strong position among Central and 
Eastern European (hereinafter also CEE) courts, reviving the Kelsenian model 
with the system of actio popularis –abstract constitutional review. However, being 
seen mostly as a demonstration of power towards the Parliament and a channel 
for direct democracy, this competence was often hugely criticized by domestic 
politicians. It is no wonder that actio popularis was one of the first competences 
targeted during the 2012 Constitutional reform, which Sólyom describes as 
a decline in constitutional culture and abandonment of principles developed 
during the last 20 years (p. 16). It is important to note, though, that this decline 
did not dwell in material content of newly introduced provisions, but in a more 
subtle procedural steps and overall change of societal and political attitudes. New 
Constitution severely abuses the principle of separation of powers and system of 
checks and balances. Many good novelties, as reform of judicial administration, 
were lost in efforts to strengthen parliamentary sovereignty on the cost of 
elimination of any of its counterweights. Sólyom’s analysis implicitly draws on 
strategic actor theories tying level of independence and endowment with 
competences of constitutional courts to electoral competition and changes in 
electoral map (Ginsburgh 2003, Ramseyer 1994, Popova 2013) - although with an 
interesting twist, as it seems that electoral map and power position might continue 
to influence the existence of Constitutional Courts past the point of their 
establishment and competence setting. His conclusion, though, is not 
a pessimistic one as he puts particularly strong emphasis on historical 
embeddedness of Hungarian constitutionalism in international law and European 





Constitutional Court’s jurisprudence in society will help the Court endure recent 
political attacks (p. 31).  
Chapters 2 to 4 seek to introduce in more detail all problems of constitutional 
amendment. In Chapter 2, “The Constitution as in Instrument of Everyday Party 
Politics,” Pál Sonnevend, András Jakab, and Lóránt Csink point out that the core 
problem of the new Constitution drawing both internal and international criticism 
lies not with the Basic Law itself, as its content is not completely dissimilar to 
other European constitutions, but with the procedural steps leading to its 
enactment. The preparatory work was short and non-transparent, excluding 
political opposition and societal actors both from the debate and decision making 
process – it is worth pointing out that Basic Law was, in the end, approved solely 
by votes of the governmental party. It could be contested that revolutionary 
constitutions in other CEE countries were enacted in a very similar pattern, 
however, with a very different source of legitimacy, and under the pressure of an 
extraordinary historical moment.  
Apart from several substantial questions as protection of minorities, 
conception of marriage and family life, or the right to life, the most problematic 
element is actually hidden in transitional provisions and subsequent constitutional 
amendments, effectively limiting checks and balances and diminishing the 
independence of judicial power. Many procedural, institutional, and personal 
changes were introduced through amendments of the Basic Law, limiting broader 
discussion on the matters. Authors here briefly comment on personnel and 
institutional changes in judiciary: While the elimination of Constitutional Court’s 
competences attracted most of the attention, government interfered strongly also 
with general judiciary, curtailing the mandate of the chief justice of former 
Supreme Court (a case which resulted in violation of European Convention on 
Human Rights in Strasbourg)2 or appointing Fidesz proponents and people close 
to Orbán to crucial public service positions. Under the pretence of purifying the 
judiciary of judges who had been in office under the communist regime, the 
retirement age was lowered across the board, which permitted the government 
to put forward its own nominees for most of the senior positions. This process 
was further accelerated by institutional reform of judicial administration: 
Previously often criticised judicial council was substituted by a new organ, 
National Judicial Office with strong personal and disciplinary competences, 
however, once again occupied by people close to Orbán. While the authors were 
fairly optimistic about a possibility of reversal of introduced changes, claiming that 
“it does not seem that there are ideological motives behind the changes to the 
constitutional system” with individual elements being too eclectic and 
contradictory (p. 108), the latest development showed that far reaching reforms of 
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personnel and administrative character shifted most of the checks and balances 
past the point of no return. A good example might be the judgment of the Court 
of Justice of the European Union regarding the age discrimination of judges, 
which didn’t have any other but declaratory effect (retired judges couldn’t return 
to their previous position which were already occupied at the time the judgment 
was delivered).3  
Kim Lane Scheppele (Chapter 3, “Understanding Hungary’s Constitutional 
Revolution”) argues that this development was fostered by long-term discontent 
of citizens, helping extreme right and nationalistic parties to raise to power, in 
combination with very week institutional checks on the constitution amendment 
process. Scheppele offers strikingly open and sharp critique, warning international 
community to take situation in Hungary, which is on the verge of tyranny, 
seriously. “[Fidesz] has gathered all of the powers of the Hungarian government 
into its own hands, without checks from any other political quarter and without 
any limits on what it can do” (p. 114). The core of the chapter focuses on the 
fourth Amendment banning the Constitutional Court from reviewing 
constitutional amendments for substantive conflicts with constitutional principles. 
Author criticised legislatively introduced nullification of Court’s previous case law. 
It’s worth noting that while it was not nullification per se, the executive power did 
render most of its previous jurisprudence ineffective, claiming it cannot be used to 
assess the principles and norms introduced by the new Basic Law. Such an 
inference into the competences of the Court, effectively limiting its interpretative 
power, is highly atypical.  
Finally, the last aspect of Hungarian controversial reforms – new Media Law 
– is analysed in depth by Gábor Polyák in Chapter 4 “Context, Rules and Praxis 
of the New Hungarian Media Laws. How Does the Media Law affect the 
Structure and Functioning of Publicity”, which describes the constitutional 
underpinnings of the media regulations and chilling effect of newly introduced 
restrictions and structural revisions on the pluralism of national media. Overall, 
first four chapters bring very good and critical assessment of changes happening 
in Hungarian society, introducing them in wider context of national constitutional 
setting.  
Unfortunately, the same cannot be said for the second part of the first 
section, as chapters devoted to Romanian structural and constitutional changes 
are quite brief, in parts even missing deeper contextual analysis considering the 
width and depth of individual problems. Bogdan Iancu (Chapter 5) introduces 
emerging crisis and power struggle between executive actors. Governmental 
interventions, removal of speakers of both Parliament houses and Ombudsman 
quickly drew attention of international community, escalating with bickering 
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between the President and the Prime Minister in the conflict revolving around 
(unconstitutional) amendment of the referendum law and Constitutional Court 
Act. Iancu interestingly points out that while the international community, mainly 
represented by the Venice Commission, and the Constitutional Court both used 
the rhetoric of rule of law and principle of the separation of powers, the criticism 
lacked credibility as these concepts were not deeply embedded in Romanian 
society (p. 161). The Constitutional Court has never before enjoyed particularly 
strong power position, rendering the expectations laid on it with imminent 
political crisis almost unreasonable. Cosmina Tanasoiu (Chapter 6) continues with 
shifting the focus on EU conditionality after the Romanian accession, reviewing 
main rule of law developments between 2007 and 2012. Both authors agree in 
their sceptical views on Control and Verification Mechanism – and instrument 
introduced by the European Commission targeting specifically Romania and 
Bulgaria in order to be able to influence domestic reforms after the end of the 
accession conditionality leverage (p. 177). Tanasoiu claims that accession, 
paradoxically, opened up new channels and possibilities for corruption scandals, 
mainly in form of EU funds. Chapter then proceeds with record of 
implementation successes and failures and infringement procedures against 
Romania. However, it lacks more comprehensive review of individual 
mechanisms introduced by the Commission and other EU institutions in order to 
target the constitutional crisis.  
 
Constitutionalism in Europe – sceptical view of Rule of Law 
prognoses 
The second section of the book, Instruments for maintaining Constitutionalism in 
Europe, promises analysis of how European Union (and other international actors) 
targeted current constitutional crises and claims to focus on future prognoses, 
seeking the positive sector in which the EU might prove to be influential. The 
core issue and leitmotif of the book, the ability of European Union to address and 
mitigate constitutional crises and democratic backsliding of its own member 
states, is addressed primarily in Chapter 7 (Frank Hoffmeister, “Enforcing the EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights in Member States”) and Chapter 8 (Armin Von 
Bogdandy, Carlino Antpöhler, Johanna Dickschen, Simon Hentrei, Matthias 
Korrmann and Maja Smrkolj, “A European Response to Doomestic 
Constitutional Crisis: Advancing the Reverse-Solange Doctrine”). Both chapters 
draw from the unwillingness of the EU institutions to trigger the sanction 
mechanism established by the Article 7 TEU and limited usability of infringement 
proceedings when dealing with questions of democracy and national 
constitutional and human rights norms. Authors propose two alternative ways 
how to comprehend current constitutional development which is only very 
loosely envisaged by the Founding treaties. Frank Hoffmeister concentrates a lot 




of attention on the scope of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union and its reception in national (constitutional) law – unfortunately quite 
mistakenly, as the character and enforceability of European Union law, Charter of 
Fundamental rights included, is based on the CJEU’s interpretation and long 
established principles, not the method of national reception or transposition. 
Declarative effect of EU law in national Constitution has merely symbolical effect 
(see conf. p. 199). Nevertheless, author rightly points out that as far as Article 7(1) 
TEU goes, while it seems that its legal requirements for action have been met, 
“the cross-party majorities to trigger this heavy instrument were present in the 
European Parliament, not in the European Commission” (p. 233), and the 
European Parliament, unfortunately, does not have an active legitimacy to 
instigate the procedure. Hoffmeister, however, sees limited indirect and appositive 
effect of parliamentary discussions, questioning, and shaming tactics among the 
politicians.  
On the contrary, Chapter 8 dismisses limited effect of all existing procedures 
and mechanisms and seeks to find “a third way” solution how to mitigate the gap 
between pre- and post-accession control. Idea of a reversed Solange principle, 
under which there is a presumption of compliance up until proven otherwise by 
a national court, was first introduced by Armin von Bogdandy and his team from 
Heildelberg’s Max Planck Institute in 2012. Nevertheless, and authors do admit 
this limitation, the doctrine of reversed Solange is directly conditioned by the 
material scope of the Charter and EU fundamental rights conception, which is up 
until today too vague and obscure. Charter’s application is limited to situations 
involving application of Union law – which, on the other hand, rarely covers 
processes related to constitutional development and rule of law. Authors built 
their argument on a very broad interpretation of Article 2 TEU (declaration of 
fundamental principles of EU law) implying that as Article 2 applies to any public 
authority, there is no reason why it should not encompass constitution-making 
processes and as such broing them under the reverse-Solange doctrine application 
scope (p. 251). Practical experience, though, does not support this argument. An 
excellent example was the way how individual institutions tackled Hungarian 
crises: The only institution openly talking about constitutional crisis and breach 
of fundamental EU values was the Parliament. Both Commission and Councils 
were quite reluctant, and most interestingly, Court of Justice, in cases which did 
fall under EU law application as the premature removal of judges from their 
functions due to changes in retirement age, was extremely careful not to use any 
value oriented argumentation or tackle the broader context of constitutional and 
rule of law crisis which in itself made the retirement so problematic. The whole 
case, being often used as a flagship of the EU influence, was based solely on the 
principle of non-discrimination.  
Following chapters address the role of other European institutions. They 





(Chapter 9, “The European Convention on Human Rights: Inherent 
Constitutional Tendencies and the Role of the European Court of Human Rights” 
by Christoph Grabenwarter), position of post-communist states and most 
frequent cases being addressed by the ECtHR against these countries (Chapter 10, 
“Central and Eastern Member States of the EU and the European Convention on 
Human Rights” by Mahulena Hofmann), especially in transitional context, and 
finally Venice Commission, consultant body of Council of Europe created in 
order to oversee and help with constitutions-drafting processes in Central and 
Eastern European countries (Chapter 11, “The Role of the Venice Commission in 
Maintaining the Rule of Law in Hungary and in Romania”, by Joakim Nergelius). 
These chapters bring easily readable and comprehensive explanation of the 
role of these institutions in safeguarding fundamental rights in Europe, although 
for a reader well oriented in the problematic of European human rights protection 
slightly underwhelming and anticlimactic, as the authors limit themselves mostly 
on descriptive observations on the system structure and competences. 
  
European Constitutional Area – Where Next? 
The final chapters of the book are devoted to theories on limits of constitutional-
making power. Matthias Hartwig introduces the “science of constitutions” 
building upon Schmidt’s conviction that a constitution is not recognized because 
it is legitimate, but it is legitimate because it is recognized (p. 312). Chapter, after 
brief recollection of constitutionalism in Kelsenian understanding, offers four 
standing approaches explaining the source of legitimacy: the religion, the will of 
people, the pure will (procedural, or power, not contextual aspect), or standards 
developed on the international level. This last point directly opens the door for 
Tilmann Altwicker’s recollection of changing autonomous sphere of constitution-
making, emphasizing that neither constitutional law nor constitutionalism belong 
any longer to domaine reservé, as constitutional makers need to face effect of more 
and more ambitious international law and international judiciary limiting their own 
decision-making power. Altwicker presents two scenarios of conflict of domestic 
constitutional norms with international conception of fundamental rights, or with 
standards of separation of powers and democratic governance (p. 333), which 
influence both substantive material scope and composition of power preset in 
domestic constitutions. While the conflicts are becoming more and more likely, 
understanding of their implications on legitimacy, and legitimacy of international 
actors, is very limited. Altwicker sees the nowadays popular term of constitutional 
pluralism as very problematic and inherently contradictory.  
The book closes with Catherine Dupré’s chapter on European 
constitutionalism and various discussions triggered by the 1992 Maastricht Treaty 
and so called constitutionalisation of the European Union (Chapter 14: “The 
Unconstitutional Constitution: A Timely Concept”). Hungarian constitutional 




development renewed discussions on European constitutionalism which was in 
a tow of scholarship on legitimacy and democratic deficit of European 
institutions. “It is time,” Dupré says, “to accept the possibility … that 
constitutions may be unconstitutional within the EU…and [to discuss] the 
boundaries of this idea.” (p. 353). Euro-constitutionalism presumed that the only 
regime a constitution can create is a democracy. This conception reflects the 
commitment of European countries to re-establishing liberal democracy after the 
Second World War. Dupré warns against the paradox of democracy – a belief that 
it can be secured through law, and that it rests upon a set of values shared within 
the European community. Establishment of the Venice Commission reflected 
expectations what all could be achieved through constitutional law: Commission 
was to play a very significant role both in constitution-making and the EU 
accession process, by evaluating the progress of CEE candidate states. Dupré 
considers it to be a clear misconception and misunderstanding to rely on the law 
as on a tool strong and sufficient enough to build strong democracy. Admittedly, 
this is a very fitting ending to a publication targeting European reactions towards 
imminent constitutional crises and democratic backsliding. As Dupré rightly 
points out, our standing set of beliefs precluded both political actors and academia 
to approach and address the events happening in Europe, to understand that not 
all constitutions, or their amendments, within otherwise democratic community 
will necessarily (and automatically) be also democratic.  
The uniqueness of the reviewed collective publication is in bringing together 
scholars commenting on not-so-well known aspects of Hungarian and Romanian 
crises, uncovering the events in domestic political arena. Interestingly, authors 
arrive to agreement that the challenges our democracies face nowadays dwell 
more in procedural limits set to principle of separation of power, than material 
scope of values and fundamental rights. Recent development in Poland, and 
adequate reaction of the European Commission, seems to conform to this pattern 
(see European Commission 2016). The urgency in the voice of the European 
Commission is unprecedented, although leaving a lot of place to wonder how 
influential soft-power tools are and what impact can they have on domestic 
political development. It seems that more comprehensive analysis of both hard 
and soft power measures of individual EU institutions is in line to fully 
comprehend and understand real influence and potential EU can achieve in 
safeguarding democracy and “European constitutional values“. One needs to 
wonder whether it is possible to target the crises of European constitutionalism 
without addressing and clarifying the meaning of the term itself, and whether the 
EU would really be able to tackle the crisis of constitutionalism if it continuously 
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